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The World Health Organization advocates the goal of universal coverage of health systems to ensure that
everyone can avail the services they need and are protected from the associated ﬁnancial risks. Gov-
ernments are increasingly engaging and interacting with the private sector in initiatives collectively
referred to as public-private partnerships (PPPs) to enhance the capacity of health systems to meet this
objective. Understanding the values that motivate partners and demonstrating commitment for building
relationships were found to be key lessons in building effective PPPs; however there, remain many
research gaps. This study focusses on the practice of PPPs at the inter-organisational (meso) level and
interpersonal (micro) level in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). The inﬂuence of the
structural components of different PPPs on stakeholder interpretation and actions, as well as the
eventual outcomes of the PPPs, is examined, in terms of a realist evaluation, which applies a context
emechanismeoutcome conﬁguration as the research methodology. Seven key factors initiating
commitment in a partnership, critical for sustainable PPPs, were identiﬁed as follows: (1) building of
trust; (2) clearly deﬁned objectives and roles; (3) time commitment; (4) transparency and candid in-
formation, particularly in relation to risk and beneﬁt; (5) contract ﬂexibility; (6) technical assistance or
ﬁnancial incentive behind procedural arrangements; and (7) the awareness and acceptability of struc-
tural changes related to responsibility and decisions (power and authority).
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Health system sustainability is a global concern in light of such
challenges as population growth, ageing, rising public expectations,
increasing prevalence of chronic diseases and multiple morbidities
and novel and chronic infectious diseases. Challenges to sustain-
ability within the health system include health system fragmen-
tation, manpower constraints and investments in technology
advancement, which put pressure on the ﬁnancing capacity of the
health systems to meet demands. Different forms of interactions
and modes of collaboration between the public and private sectors,
known as public-private partnership (PPP), have been increasingly
studied as a means of mobilising resources to enhance health sys-
tem capacity and sustainability. The private sector includes for-
proﬁt organisations and corporations, not-for-proﬁt non-lic Health Building, Prince of
).
Ltd. This is an open access article ugovernmental organisations (NGOs) and charitable philanthropic
organisations (Galea and McKee, 2014). The World Bank deﬁnes
PPP (World Bank Institute, 2012) as “a long-term contract between
a private party and a government agency, for providing a public
asset or service, inwhich the private party bears signiﬁcant risk and
management responsibility” (p.11). However, applying the term
‘partnership’ to characterise the relationship between government
and non-government actors is problematic because the term sug-
gests an equal status and authority for the actors involved (Martens,
2003). Thus, in the health sector, the World Health Organization
(WHO) describes partnership (Kickbusch and Quick, 1998) as a
means to “bring together a set of actors for the common goal of
improving the health of populations based on mutually agreed
roles and principles” (p.69). In this deﬁnition, agreement on key
principles is considered crucial, as well as maintaining a balance of
power between the parties, to enable each to retain its core values
and identities (Buse andWalt, 2000a). In the global context, diverse
forms of publiceprivate interactions include modes of collabora-
tion such as contracting public services, privately ﬁnancingnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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sponsibility projects with co-regulatory mechanisms (Buse and
Waxman, 2001). Most of these interactions and arrangements are
not new, and they are currently grouped under the term of PPP
(Richter, 2004).
Currently, the deﬁnition of PPP lacks speciﬁcity and consistency,
with different countries, sectors and projects conceptualising PPP
differently in various political, economic and social environment
contexts. For example, in Europe, the most common PPP model is
the private ﬁnance initiative through which quality services are
purchased on a long-term basis from the private sector (Roehrich
et al., 2014), whereas designebuildeoperate contracts for build-
ing hospitals are more common in Australia (Cruz and Marques,
2013). In the US and HKSAR, PPP is being used to enhance the
contractual relationship between a public agency and a private
entity, promoting greater private-sector participation in the de-
livery and/or ﬁnancing of government-initiated infrastructure
projects (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2003, 2008a,b;
U.S. Department of Transportation, 2009).
A recent systematic review of PPPs examined the current state
of PPP research and the emerging themes of interest for health
research (Roehrich et al., 2014) Different conceptualisations of PPPs
with a number of overlapping dimensions were found: shared
objectives; inter-organisational relationships; risk, power and in-
formation sharing; and cooperation and contractual governance.
The three research themes of PPP outcomes, policies and practice
emerged from this. In their analysis of outcomes, the authors did
not ﬁnd a consistent pattern in the reported beneﬁts and disad-
vantages of interventions for public infrastructure and services. The
second theme analysed the policy aims of PPPs, which created the
macro-environment wherein speciﬁc programmes of PPPs were
conceived, formulated, developed and implemented. The policies
for PPPs deﬁned the potential beneﬁts that could accrue as out-
comes of successful intervention. The third theme focussed on the
meso- and micro-levels at which PPPs were practised at the inter-
organisational and interpersonal levels, respectively. The inter-
organisational governance mechanism as well as the relations
and management of stakeholder relationships were found to be
critical for developing collaborative partnerships, where the values
and goals of the private and public sectors were different and in-
formation and power asymmetries operate. In the practice of PPPs,
they also found limited understandings of the effects of incentive
mechanisms on service performance. Several studies reported
problems arising from information and power asymmetry between
public and private sectors and the need for stakeholder involve-
ment and alignment to establish and maintain inter-organisational
trust. In a comparative analysis of nine PPP infrastructure projects
in the Netherlands, which also focussed on the meso- and micro-
levels in the practise of PPPs, the authors concluded that project
characteristics determine the unique composition of factors
determining the success and failure of each of the projects. Inter-
action needed to develop common understanding and mutual trust
were also highlighted (Koppenjan, 2005). Understand the values
that motivate partners and demonstrating commitment for build-
ing relationships were found to be key to building effective PPPs
(Ramiah and Reich, 2006).
In the context of the structure and content of the particular PPP
and its functioning, at the inter-organisational and interpersonal
levels in practice, there are research gaps in the nature of PPPs,
whether they works and, if so, under what conditions. This
knowledge is crucial to understanding the heterogeneity of PPPs in
different contextual environments and in evaluating the role,
beneﬁts and impact of PPPs on health systems, and thus their role
in policymaking.2. Methods
This study evaluates the introduction of key publiceprivate
initiatives, collaborations, interactions and partnerships, collec-
tively known as PPPs, in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(HKSAR). The study focusses on the practice of PPPs at the inter-
organisational (meso) and interpersonal (micro) levels. Further, it
examines the inﬂuence of the structural components of different
PPPs on stakeholder interpretation and actions, as well as the
eventual outcomes of the interventions. A better understanding of
the interactions between the contextual environment of PPPs and
the mechanisms of stakeholder interpretation and actions around
the interventionwould provide insights into the enabling factors to
be considered in future policy development and implementation of
PPPs.
The following four objectives were addressed:
 description of the key elements of seven PPP initiatives in
HKSAR's health sector;
 exploration of stakeholders' perception of engagement, chal-
lenges, beneﬁts of PPPs and behavioural responses observed in
their actions;
 exploration of stakeholder views on the function of PPP and the
private sector's role in the health system; and
 identiﬁcation of enabling factors for successful and sustainable
implementation of PPPs, which could provide knowledge and
insights for governments considering PPPs as a means of
meeting health system goals.2.1. Research design
Realist evaluation was used to evaluate the impact of PPPs in
HKSAR by considering the contextual environment in terms of
three key elements: context, mechanism and outcome. Realist
evaluation is a theory-driven approach focussed on understanding
the mechanism of what works for whom in what circumstances
and how programmes worked or did not work in their contextual
setting, rather than simply measuring outcomes (Pawson and
Tilley, 1997). In its four stages of evaluation, hypotheses are
derived from the literature; data are collected to investigate the
hypotheses, which are systematically tested in subgroup analysis;
and the results are assessed and interpreted within the context of
the study. In this study, realist evaluation furthered our under-
standing of PPP functioning in terms of the interactions they
offered to people and how interactions affected the PPPs.
2.2. Research setting
Hong Kong became a British territory in 1842 after the Opium
Wars, and sovereignty over Hong Kong was transferred back to
mainland China in 1997, creating a Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region (HKSAR) of China. A novel constitution arrangement,
the Basic Law serves as a mini-constitution of the HKSAR, based on
the principle of ‘one country two systems’. Under this, HKSAR is
given a high degree of autonomy in its economic, social and polit-
ical systems with Mainland China having jurisdiction for defence
and foreign affairs. Under British administration, the health system
in HKSAR developed along similar lines to that in the UK. The
HKSAR health system is publicly ﬁnanced by general tax revenues,
in which the government subsidises, on average, 95% of the total
cost of hospital, specialist care and primary care in the public sector.
These publicly provided health-care services are organised into
seven geographical clusters with 42 acute and rehabilitation hos-
pitals and institutions, 48 specialist outpatient clinics, 74 primary
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population of seven million, managed by the Hospital Authority
(HA), a public body established by statutes. The HA is mainly
responsible for delivering secondary and tertiary specialist care,
medical rehabilitation and some primary care. The government's
Department of Health (DH) serves to regulate and safeguard com-
munity health through a range of disease prevention and health
promotion activities in child health clinics, student health centres,
school dental care programmes, men's and women's health centres
and health service for the elderly. Twelve private hospitals and
about 3500 private clinics provide 10% of hospital care and 70% of
primary care. Both the HA and DH services are accountable to the
Food and Health Bureau, the government bureau ultimately
responsible for all food- and health-related public policies in
HKSAR (Grifﬁths, 2013).
2.3. Data collection
Data from both primary and secondary data sources were used.
Primary data were collected from key informant interviews with
individuals working in different sectors including the government
departments responsible for policy and program design, for-proﬁt
corporations and not-for-proﬁt organisations involved in different
PPPs, patient support groups and patient representatives from June
2013 to March 2014. The interviews were semi-structured and led
by a discussion guide derived from the literature review and
research experience. The discussion guide covered the four
following topics: (1) perception of engagement with public sector,
challenges and beneﬁts of PPP; (2) action in response to PPPs; (3)
suggestions for the functioning of PPPs; and (4) views on the po-
tential roles of the private sector in enhancing the effectiveness and
sustainability of PPPs for future development. The informants were
allowed and encouraged to share any views related to PPPs. To
ensure consistency, all of the interviews were conducted by two
designated researchers. The interviews averaged about 1 h and
15 min in length. They were conducted at locations where the in-
formants felt free to express their views. Participation in the in-
terviews was voluntary, and informants were informed of the study
purpose and data collection procedure in advance. The informants
were also informed of their rights to participate, and theywere able
to withdraw from the study at any point. Data conﬁdentiality and
anonymity were ensured.
2.4. Data analysis
A PPP initiative is regarded as a social input that will reconﬁgure
or activate the underlying causal mechanisms of the pre-existing
social structure differently to generate change within the action
context (Pawson, 2002; Pawson and Tilley, 1997). In this study,
context refers to the speciﬁc features of the seven key PPP initia-
tives, which can be considered as a meso-level of society intro-
duced within the macro-environment of the health sector PPP
policy. The mechanisms were considered to be the cognitive
interpretation of PPP and behavioural responses or actions to be the
‘causal pathway’ triggered in the context through which the impact
of PPPs was realised. After synthesising the data, the impact of
seven key PPPs was analysed using realist evaluation in a ‘con-
textemechanismeoutcome (CMO)’ conﬁguration to explore the
complex interactions between the features of PPPs as the context
and mechanism of different levels of commitments activated,
generated by stakeholders' cognitive (perceived engagement with
public sector, challenges and beneﬁts of PPPs) and subsequent
behavioural response (actions that are the consequence of cogni-
tive response), and the outcomes (perceived private sector's role in
and views on the effectiveness and sustainability of PPPs) producedboth intentionally and unintentionally. Thus, CMO was deﬁned as
follows:
 Context refers to the key features of each of the seven PPPs in the
PublicePrivate Partnership Assessment (PPPA) criteria with the
following eight categories: initiated by whom, policy in-
struments, ﬁnancial arrangement, function transfer, ownership
of private sector, activities of private sector, target public and
type of health service. The PPPA Framework is derived from the
Private Health Sector Assessment by Harding-Preker from the
World Bank (Chakraborty and Harding, 2003), the literature
review (Barr, 2007; Buse and Walt, 2000b) and past research
experience.
 Mechanism refers to the commitment activated by stakeholders'
cognitive and subsequent behavioural responses, triggered by
the structural features of the PPPs (meso-level of context) when
engaging with the public sector. The level of commitment of
stakeholders to the PPPs is critical to enhancing their effec-
tiveness and sustainability. A high level of commitment (high
commitment) is a strong buy-in demonstrated by behavioural
responses that positively affect programmes such as investment
in additional staff and installation of information technology for
the programme. This is also demonstrated by the uptake rate by
patients. Conversely, a low level of commitment (low commit-
ment) is represented by either little or no action that hampers
the success of PPP and is further demonstrated by a low uptake
rate by the patient (Cheyne et al., 2013);
 Outcome refers to the potential role of private sectors in the
health system and views on the sustainability and effectiveness
of PPPs.2.5. Trustworthiness
To ensure the creditability of both the quantitative and quali-
tative data, the information was triangulated, compared and
conﬁrmed according to various data collection sources. In addition,
the research team held discussions to identify and analyse the
comments derived from the data collection and consider alterna-
tive explanations for the ﬁndings.
2.6. Ethical approval
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Survey and
Behavioural Research Ethics Committee of the Chinese University of
Hong Kong.
3. Findings
3.1. Context
Reviewing the capacity of service delivery and the health
ﬁnancing system, the HKSAR publicly highlighted the role of PPP in
2003 (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2003, p.1), stating
that “it provide a number of alternative ways of involving the pri-
vate sector in the delivery of public services” (p.1). The government
further deﬁned PPP in health sector as collaboration between the
public and private sectors to provide healthcare infrastructure or
service (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2008b) “A
contractual arrangement involving the private sector in the de-
livery of public services… is shared between the public and private
sectors, both of which bring their complementary skills to the en-
terprise” (p.5). In 2003, an introductory guide to PPP deﬁned it as an
alternative means of delivering public services and goods. This was
followed by a document that repositioned the roles of the public
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emphasised contractual agreements as policy tools to engage the
private sector in 2008. The government started developing a shared
information technology system for electronic health records in both
public and private sectors in 2005. This facilitates the exchange of
information on patients who use services in both sectors to bridge
the fragmentation of health-care delivery between both sectors.
Information sharing was a policy adopted by government as a
means of engaging the private sector, and it laid an important
foundation for future PPP transactions. Concomitantly, the gov-
ernment launched a series of seven different types of PPPs on a pilot
basis, aimed at decreasing the waiting time for specialist outpatient
clinics, general outpatient clinics and cataract surgery; increasing
the coverage of ﬂu vaccination; and promoting the use of preven-
tive care in primary care. In these seven key PPPs, the government
mainly adopted demand-side interventions through contractual
relationships with the private sector as the policy instrument to
inﬂuence the private sector in health care. The key contextual
milestones for the development and introduction of PPPs into the
HKSAR health-care system are shown in Fig. 1, and the contextual
analysis of the seven PPP programmes initiated by the government
using the PPPA criteria is shown in Table 1.3.2. Mechanism: stakeholders' views of PPPs and their commitment
mechanism
The cognitive response was expressed in the stakeholder per-
ceptions of trust and engagement. This was clearly deﬁned as the
programme design, challenges in the implementation process and
incentives of PPPs, which triggered behavioural responses to the
action taken. The levels of commitment to the PPPs are analysed
based on the behavioural response, which is critical for the effec-
tiveness and sustainability of the PPP interventions. A summary of
the mechanism is given in Fig. 2. This could be analysed from
perception and experience sharing from the key informant in-
terviews and observing the responses to the different PPP initia-
tives. The features of Haemodialysis PPP and General Outpatient
Clinic PPP (GOPC PPP) programmes triggered the mechanism of
‘high commitment’. Therewas early engagement during pre-tenderFig. 1. Milestone of PPP developmediscussions, tender brieﬁngs and logistic meetings, which built
trust between public and private sectors, manifested in active
support of the programme. The behavioural response demon-
strated commitment by the private sector to drive such partner-
ships forward. In addition, the private sector also described clearly
deﬁned objectives and roles of PPP, which would facilitate proﬁle
building and encourage business growth. The level of high
commitment was evident in other examples of behavioural re-
sponses as well, such as appointing amore advanced clerical staff to
deal with an advanced IT system for patient enrolment and reim-
bursement procedures, which led to the establishment of an
auditing process and the installation of technology to improve the
quality of care and to increase service capacity. In both pro-
grammes, patients also responded positively because theywere not
required to pay extra fees and were able to obtain services faster in
a better physical environment with a clear referral system. Patients
perceived this as a good alternative to obtaining quality care, with a
promising initial invitation acceptance of 21e31% (Audit
Commission, 2012). However, the private sector only played a
passive role in publicising private-sector service providers who had
enrolled, which had only been communicated by word of mouth.
However, the high level of commitment was not as obvious in
some PPPs. In the Elderly Healthcare Voucher Scheme, the regis-
tration of the Hong Kong Identity Card on enrolment in private
clinics required an advanced IT system and manpower to handle
the procedure prior to service delivery. The private sector engaged
less in the logistic arrangements, which was perceived as ‘top-
down’. Informants in the private sector expressed concern over the
IT capability of clerical staff, the length of the registration process
and other logistic arrangement on top of existing businesses. The
imbalance of power between the private and public sectors may
have been caused by constraints on the public sector's procurement
system, which is inﬂexible for collaborationwith the private sector,
misconstrued as the government's non-responsiveness to the pri-
vate sector's needs. In addition, the private sector did not have a
platform for seeking technical or ﬁnancial support necessary from
the public sector to install computer systems. As a consequence,
service providers in the private sector were reluctant to support the
programme actively. Patients expressed the view that informationnt in Hong Kong, 1990e2012.
Table 1
Context: features of pilot-based PPP initiatives using PPPA.
PPP initiatives
Year
Initiated by Policy instruments Financial
arrangement
Function transfer Ownership of
private sector
Activities of private
sector
Public
Curative
(1) Cataract Surgery Programme
Year: 2008eNow
Hospital Authority
with set quota
Service contracting: Copayment: patient
copayment at open
market price with
ﬁxed demand-side
subsidy (HK$5000,
copay not more than
$8000)
Service delivery on
one preoperative
assessment,
cataract surgery
including lens, two
post-operative
checks
For-proﬁt corporate  Hospital
 Clinic
Patients with
cataract
(2) Haemodialysis PPP
Year: 2010eNow
Hospital Authority
with set quota
Service contracting Purchase: patient
pays same amount for
each session as the
public sector
Service delivery on
haemodialysis
treatment
 For-proﬁt
corporate
 Non-proﬁt
organisation
Nursing-led
haemodialysis
centre
Patients with stable
condition of end-
stage renal failure
Preventive Care and Health Maintenance
(3) General Outpatient Clinic (GOPC) PPP
Year: 2008eNow
Hospital Authority
with target population
Service contracting: Purchase: patient
copayment at the
same amount as the
public sector
10 consultation
visits per year
 For-proﬁt
corporate
 Non-proﬁt
organisation
Clinic Patients with stable
condition of
diabetes and
hypertension living
in Tin Shiu Wai
(New Territories
West)
(4) a. Inﬂuenza Vaccination Subsidy
Scheme (IVSS) or Childhood
Inﬂuenza Vaccination Subsidy
(CIVSS)
Year: 2008eNow
b. Elderly Inﬂuenza Vaccination
Subsidy
Scheme (EVSS)
Year: 2009eNow
c. Human Swine Inﬂuenza
Vaccination
Subsidy Scheme (HSIVSS)
Year: 2009eNow
Department of Health Service contracting Copayment: patient
copayment at open
market price with a
ﬁxed demand-side
subsidy of HK$160
per dose of inﬂuenza
Service delivery on
vaccination for
inﬂuenza
 For-proﬁt
corporate
 Non-proﬁt
organisation
Clinic General public
(5) Elderly Healthcare Voucher Scheme
Year: 2009eNow
Food and Health Bureau Service contracting Copayment: patient
copayment at open
market price with
ﬁxed demand-side
subsidy of HK$2000
per year
(accumulated to a
ceiling of HK$4000)
Service delivery on
both curative and
preventive care
 For-proﬁt
corporate
 Non-proﬁt
organisation
Clinic Elder aged 70
(6) Shared Care Programme
Year: 2010e2013
Hospital Authority with
set quota
Service contracting Copayment: patient
copayment at open
market price with
ﬁxed demand-side
subsidy of HK$1400
per year
Service delivery on
consultation
service only
For-proﬁt corporate Clinic Patients with stable
condition of
diabetes and
hypertension living
in Shatin, Tai Po
(New Territories
East), Wan Chai,
Eastern Districts
(Hong Kong East)
Screening
(7) Radiological Imaging Services
Year: 2012eNow
Hospital Authority Exhortation Information
dissemination
Referral for
radiological
imaging service
including CT scan
and MRI
For-proﬁt corporate Diagnostic
laboratories
Both inpatients and
outpatients in the
public sector
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services was not clear and that the subsidy amount was not
attractive. Only 57% of eligible people registered with accounts in
2010 (Audit Commission, 2012). The subsidy amount per year was
raised from HK$500 in 2010 to HK$1000 in 2012, and eventually to
its current level of HK$2000 in 2014 (Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, 2015a). Subsequently, more service pro-
viders in the private sector enrolled in the programme, and they
appeared to accept the changes despite the initial dissatisfaction
with the patient registration process. The uptake rate of eligible
people increased from 57% in 2010 to 77% by the end of May in 2015
(Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2015b). Efforts were
made to facilitate communication between the public and private
sectors. This can be considered as a mechanism of ‘increasing
commitment’.
Informants from the patient group commented that any change
in their behaviour depended mainly on individual self-interest and
goals consistentwith the public choice theory. They were concerned
with the costs involved in service provider transactions and the
nature of the contractual relationships. In the case of the Haemo-
dialysis PPP and GOPC PPP, these issues were addressed, access to
health care improved and patients perceived this as a good alter-
native. This mechanism of ‘high commitment’ was not triggered in
the Shared Care Programme sharing in both private sector and pa-
tients. It was likely due to the lack of contract ﬂexibility, inwhich the
private sector only provided consultation and patients were
required to revisit the HA for medication prescribed. Consultation
without medication was considered as compartmentalisation of
care, and it was not well received in HKSAR. Although this pro-
gramme was subsidised by the government at a public-sector cost,
copayment was required of patients at open market rates for
consultation services. The patient enrolment was low (6%) in 2011,
whichwas related to the compartmentalisation of care aswell as the
issue of affordability (Audit Commission, 2012). Thus, the mecha-
nism of commitment activated in the Share Care Programme was
low. A similar ‘low-commitment’ mechanism was observed in the
Radiological Imaging Services, with the private sector perceiving a
lack of engagement in the design of PPP as well a lack of referral
pathway. In addition, there was no system to generate a list of pri-
vate service providers interested in joining the programme.
Despite the efforts in engagement, the responses of both the
private sector and patients to the Contract Surgery Programme and
the Inﬂuenza and Pneumococcal Vaccination Subsidy Scheme,
which both provided partial subsidies at market fee, were mixed.
The complicated registration and reimbursement processes were
presented as challenges in the private sector, whereas low voucher
amounts and priority given to preventive care were perceived as
barriers for patients. This signalled the importance of technical
assistance for the reimbursement procedures and ﬁnancial in-
centives in the implementation process of the interventions to
drive the ‘high-commitment’ mechanism forward.
3.3. Outcome
3.3.1. Suggestion for how the PPPs should function
Following the introduction of the seven key PPP initiatives, the
informants deﬁned PPP as any activity performed in collaboration
between the public and private sectors or involving the use of
public money to purchase public services/good from the private
sector. NGO stakeholders and patients supported the concept of
PPP as the sharing of social responsibility in the health system
between the public and private sectors. The informants suggested
that the ultimate goal of PPP should be a healthy competition, and
that the private sector should play a complementary role in the
health system. Others described PPP as a political tool to mobiliseresources in the private sector and to relieve pressure and work
burden placed on the public system (e.g., waiting list), share the
workload (e.g., backlog cases), increase service efﬁciency (e.g.,
waiting times) and improve the quality of care (e.g., patient satis-
faction and safety), thereby improving the overall health of the
population.
The majority of informants perceived this stage of PPP devel-
opment as ‘involvement’ through outsourcing or contracting and
ﬁnancing on the demand side rather than a ‘partnership’. They
expressed the view that the government did not explicitly state its
aims and long-term plan of the PPPs. All of the PPP initiatives were
launched as either case or pilot-based. It was a piecemeal approach,
and the long-term direction of PPP was unclear. The private played
a passive role in publicity at this stage, when the PPP initiatives
were announced in public without the participation and presence
of private-sector collaborators. This would have led to mistrust and
false expectations. Rather than social responsibility being shared in
a partnership between the public and private sectors only, the
burden was shifted from the former to the latter:
‘We are frustrated that there is no explicit and clear information on
the project aim and its long-term plan… It deﬁnitely hinders our
long-term business plan.’ (Informant 6)
‘We don't have any say on the planning or even implementation
stage…We are passive in the development of PPP…’ (Informant 3)
‘We are not familiar with the technical jargon and IT system in the
public sector, which affects our discussion…’ (Informant 4)
Thus, informants suggested having a formal platform or unit for
actively engaging the private sector in the planning or imple-
mentation stages. In the programme where electronic health re-
cord sharing was in place well before the case/pilot-based PPP
project, the informants stated that trust was built among the
stakeholders and the ethical considerations of the referral mecha-
nism and the conﬁdentiality issues surrounding the sharing of
patient information were overcome.3.3.2. Suggestion for potential roles of the private sector for
effectiveness and sustainability of PPPs for future development
After experiencing a series of PPP programmes, a strategic
partnership required a deﬁned role, and informants from the pri-
vate sector expressed that they could function as gatekeepers for
the health system:
‘The government manages 80-90% of inpatient service while we
contribute to about 70% of outpatient service. Thus, the government
should work with us to strengthen primary care, and we can act as
a gatekeeper for the health system to avoid the over-burden of
inpatient service.’ (Informant 3)
This sentiment was echoed by informants from the public
sector.
Informants from the private sector further highlighted their
complementary role in preventive and curative care, in particular in
haemodialysis and cataract service:
‘When there is a long waiting list for ambulatory care in public
hospitals, we could help because this type of patient will only
occupy the bed for not more than 1 or 2 days in our private practice.
A high turnover rate will generate high marginal proﬁt, and we can
take up those patients in the waiting list…’ (Informant 3)
One informant indicated that the private sector could play a role
Fig. 2. CMOs for different PPP models.
Source: (Audit Commission, 2012; Centre for Health Protection, 2014; Hong Kong Hospital Authority, 2010, 2014; Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2014, 2015b).
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‘It is a good opportunity to let interns have primary care training in
the private sector so that they can know another side of the health
system… We are happy to facilitate this in terms of training and
venue support.’ (Informant 4)
The summary of outcomes in different contexts and mecha-
nisms is shown in Fig. 2.4. Discussion
A realist evaluation method was used to further our under-
standing of the PPPs in CMO conﬁgurations, allowing us to analyse
how change unfolds in the implementation of PPP practice in a
mixed health system. The HK government has committed to sup-
port six of the seven key PPPs, whereas the Share Care Programme
was phased out and its target population will be taken up by the
GOPC PPP. The fundamental proposition in causal pathway mech-
anisms is that each programme has different features and ap-
proaches, creating different micro-contexts within the macro-
politicaleeconomicesocial environment, and triggering different
levels of commitment in private-sector providers and public-sector
patients.We found that themechanism of ‘high commitment’was a
powerful agent of change as demonstrated in behavioural re-
sponses including employment strategies, current IT, quality con-
trol compliance and the provision of market incentives. This
mechanism is known to cause considerable change, particularly insettings with an unequal balance of power and authority between
public and private sectors and poor patient trust in PPP (Richter,
2004). However, constraints in the micro-level context of PPPs in
HKSAR included technical factors: a complicated patient enrolment
and reimbursement procedure, the requirement of an advanced IT
system, a lack of guaranteed patient enrolment and inadequate
internal communication were perceived as challenges to ‘high
commitment’. The context in which PPPs was characterised as
compartmentalised care or stand-alone information dissemination
did not have a positive effect as demonstrated in the Share Care
Programme. Furthermore, the contextual features of PPPs, which
involved patient copayment at the market rate, were less likely to
be sustainable over the long term, given the concerns of afford-
ability and equity.
A further strength of realist evaluation is in the potential for
developing an explanatory theory from an iterative analysis of CMO
conﬁgurations, in order to infer what works, for whom, how, and in
what circumstances in relation to the use of PPPs in the context of
HKSAR.4.1. What works and in what circumstance
PPPs were clearly shown to extend the private sector's com-
plementary role to the public sector in two PPPs including the
Haemodialysis PPP and GOPC PPP, in which mechanisms of ‘high
commitment’ were triggered with positive behavioural response
and uptake rates. The same amount of patient copayment as in the
public sector was a favourable feature that triggered positive
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deﬁned interactions without the need for extra payment were
critical to a mechanism of a high level of commitment. On the
contrary, compartmentalisation of care, copayment at the open
market price and service on an open-ended basis provided by the
private sector in the Share Care Programme and the lack of referral
pathway in Radiological Imaging Services led to a mechanism of
‘low-commitment’. The complexity of a PPP might be regarded as
an unfavourable circumstance, which may lead to unanticipated
and undesired mechanisms and subsequent outcomes. Despite
increasing engagement with the private sector, the complicated
registration and reimbursement process and lack of technical
assistance and ﬁnancial incentive in the Cataract Surgery Pro-
gramme and the Vaccination Subsidy Scheme negatively affected
the commitment of partners; therefore, this led to the mechanism
of ‘moderate commitment’. Features such as poor procurement
incentives, a lack of coordination among government agencies, a
lack of expertise or sufﬁcient information and high transaction
costs incurred from proceeding with PPP deals can be detrimental
(Wolf, 1986).
4.2. For whom
HKSAR PPPs were perceived as a useful heuristic for organising
care by public not-for-proﬁt NGOs and charitable philanthropic
organisations with strong values of social responsibility, for
example, GOPC PPP and Elderly Healthcare Voucher. Furthermore,
PPPs gave for-proﬁt corporations aiming at market expansion an
opportunity to build their proﬁle so as to enhance proﬁts, for
example, in the Haemodialysis PPP and Cataract Programmes. Thus,
successful activation of a ‘high-commitment’ mechanism was
dependent on the stakeholders' perspectives of the balance of
beneﬁt and risk. Patients saw PPPs as an alternative choice of health
care when it linked to incentives in terms of time, ﬁnance and
quality. Developing the trust between patients and the private
sector is seen to be crucial factor for shifting their utilisation habits
(Zitron, 2006).
4.3. How
The ﬁndings show that a ‘high-commitment’ mechanism was
observed when the private sector was fully engaged from the
development stage to implementation through design planning,
the tendering process and administrative procedure. In addition,
strategic administrative support in terms of referral systems,
auditing processes, IT and information sharing were considered
important in sustaining PPPs; electronic sharing of clinical infor-
mation between public and private sectors was also highly valued
by both sectors. The interaction, role and referral systems between
public and private systems were made explicit, essential in guiding
the successful implementation of PPPs and demonstrating gov-
ernment commitment. One key informant suggested establishing a
support unit for PPPs to guide the explicit use of PPPs.
5. Insights
PPPs play an important role in engaging the private sector to
increase the capacity of the health system to serve the needs of the
public better. The development of the PPPs and their impact varied
considerably, which reﬂects different contexts in terms of political,
economic, social, governance and institutional arrangements. The
unique features of different PPPs models trigger the mechanisms
for acquiring understanding and actions emanating from public
and private interaction. PPP interventions trigger mechanisms
based on perception, understanding and behavioural response ofpartners, which may lead to different outcomes. This is markedly
inﬂuenced by the contextual environment. The case study pre-
sented in this paper highlights some features and challenges that
increase PPP sustainability and our understanding of the interac-
tion between contexts and mechanisms and the resultant out-
comes, which will affect the effectiveness and sustainability of the
partnerships. Strategic partnership building is a dynamic process
(O'Faircheallaigh, 2010). Seven key factors that triggered commit-
ment in partners critical for sustainability of the projects were
identiﬁed, as described in Fig. 2. These are as follows: (1) building of
trust; (2) clearly deﬁned objectives and roles; (3) time commit-
ment; (4) transparency and candid information, particularly in
relation to risk and beneﬁt; (5) contract ﬂexibility; (6) technical
assistance or ﬁnancial incentive behind procedural arrangements;
and (7) the awareness and acceptability of structural changes
related to responsibility and decisions (power and authority). The
contextual environment was critical for the effectiveness of a PPP,
and these contexts could be highly dissimilar. Governance played
an important role in the development of PPPs. A successful and
sustainable PPP requires a coherent policy-planning framework as
well as systematic and proactive follow-up procedures for building
a partnership with the private sector to use resources optimally for
improving the health of the population.
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